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28 1 The identical Motion was filed twice, one in a redactedversion (Dkt. No. 35) and once unredacted and under seal (Dkt. No.
45). This order contains no confidential facts but pertains to both
versions of the Motion.  
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MULTI TIME MACHINE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMAZON.COM, AND AMAZON
SERVICES LLC,
Defendant.
___________________________
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. CV 11-09076 DDP (MANx)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Dkt. Nos. 35 & 45 ]
Presently before the court is Defendants Amazon.com, Inc. and
Amazon Services LLC (collectively “Amazon”)’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.1  Having considered the parties’ submissions and heard
oral argument, the court adopts the following order.  
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I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are not disputed or confidential.
Multi Time Machine, Inc. (“MTM”) sells military style watches
under the brand names “MTM Special Ops” and “MTM Military Ops.” (In
Support of Amazon’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Decl. of Marc Levy
[“Levy Decl.”], Exh. A 21:5–8.) MTM sells its watches through its
website and through a limited number of authorized distributors,
but not through Amazon.  (Id. at 39:10–40:5, 48:9–15). In addition,
MTM does not authorize its distributors to sell its watches on
Amazon. (Id. at 49:24–51:11.)
Amazon is an online retailer that sells millions of products
directly to consumers and that hosts third-party sellers. (In
Support of Amazon’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Decl. of Daniel
Rose [“Rose Decl.”] ¶ 2.) Amazon’s search function attempts to
retrieve products that consumers are likely to be interested in
purchasing. (Id. at ¶ 3.) To do so, its search function does not
only provide results that match the actual words used by the
consumer in his or her query. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Like Google and Bing,
Amazon’s search engine employs search technologies that rely on
consumer behavior.  (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 7). These technologies allow
Amazon to retrieve results that do not include the search term.
(Id. at ¶ 7.)
In response to a consumer’s search, Amazon provides the
consumer a list of products on a search results page. (In Support
of Amazon’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Decl. of Paul Jaye [“Jaye
Decl.”] ¶ 6, Exh. A.) For each product, Amazon generates a “product
listing,” which primarily consists of an image of the product and a
title identifying the product. (Id.) For example, when a consumer
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searches for “mtm special ops,” Amazon’s search function provides
ten results, each with its own product listing. (Id.) Since MTM
does not sell its watches on Amazon or authorize its distributors
to sell its watches on Amazon, its watches do not appear among the
product listings for that search. (Id.) Instead, all of the watches
retrieved by Amazon belong to MTM’s competitors, in particular
Luminox and Chase-Durer. (Id. at Exh. A; Levy Decl., Exh. A at
59:25–60:5.) 
A. Search Results Page
On the search results page, the search query—“mtm special
ops”—appears in two locations: in the search query box and directly
below the search query box in what is termed the “breadcrumb.”
(Jaye Decl. at ¶ 7.) The breadcrumb displays the original query in
quotation marks to provide a trail for the consumer to follow back
to the original search. (Id.) Directly below the breadcrumb, Amazon
provides “Related Searches” in case consumers are unsatisfied with
the results from their original search.  (Id. at ¶ 8, Exh. A.) For
example, after searching for the term “mtm special ops,” Amazon’s
search results page suggests the related search “mtm special ops
watch.” (Id. at Exh. A.)
Accordingly, after searching for “mtm special ops” in Amazon’s
search query box, those words appear in three locations: (1) in the
search query box, (2) in the breadcrumb below that box, and (3) in
the related search below the breadcrumb. (Id.) A gray bar with the
heading “Showing 10 Results” separates those three locations from
the product listings below. (Id. at ¶ 6.)
Below the product listings, the “MTM” brand also appears in an
advertisement under the heading “Sponsored Links.” (Id. at Exh. A;
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Levy Decl., Exh. A at 64:6–20.) The advertisement includes a
hyperlink titled “Tactical Watches By MTM,” the description “MTM
Tactical Watches Worn By Military, Police, Sportsmen,” and another
hyperlink to MTM’s website: www.specialopswatch.com/. (Jaye Decl.
at Exh. A.)
B. Product Detail Page
Consumers cannot purchase products from Amazon’s search
results page. (Id. at ¶ 9.) To purchase a product, consumers first
must navigate to a “product detail page” by clicking on a product
listing. (Id.; Levy Decl., Exh. A at 63:14–19.) From there,
consumers can purchase the product by adding the product to his or
her cart or by using Amazon’s “One-Click” option. (Jaye Decl. at ¶
9.)
The product detail page includes a large image of the product,
a hyperlink identifying the brand of the product, and a title
identifying the product in larger font. (Id. at ¶ 10.) For example,
the first product provided by Amazon’s search function in response
to the “mtm special ops” query is a product titled “Luminox Men’s
8401 Black Ops Watch.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) That watch’s product detail
page provides a large image of the watch’s face, which identifies
the Luminox brand, a hyperlink identifying the Luminox brand, and a
title identifying the watch in larger font as the “Luminox Men’s
8401 Black Ops Watch.” (Id. at ¶ 10, Exh. C.)
On the product detail page, the words from the search
query—“mtm special ops”—appear in the search query box. (Id.) A
gray bar separates this box from the product detail page below.
(Id. at ¶ 10.) Below the product detail page, Amazon suggests other
products to the consumer under various headings. (Id. at Exh. C.)
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One such heading, titled “Customers Viewing This Page May Be
Interested in These Sponsored Links,” displays sponsored hyperlinks
titled “MTM Watches,” with a link to www.yahoo.com, and “Military
Watches Sale,” which takes the consumer to
cyber.monday.interiorsbuyer.com.  (Id.) 
Accordingly, after navigating to a product detail page, the
consumer can see the words “mtm special ops” in Amazon’s search
query box and a reference to MTM and its products in the sponsored
advertisement.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A party
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the
court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions
of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the
absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.  Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  All reasonable inferences from
the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.  See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986).  
If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at
trial, it is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate
that “there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case.”  Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to
the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.  Summary judgment is warranted if a
party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”  Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322.  A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law.”  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
moving party.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a
genuine issue of triable fact.”  Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,
1278 (9th Cir. 1996). Counsel has an obligation to lay out their
support clearly.  Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d
1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001).  The court “need not examine the entire
file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the
evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate
references so that it could conveniently be found."  Id.
III. DISCUSSION
In her concurrence to Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., Judge Berzon presented the following
hypothetical:
I walk into Macy's and ask for the Calvin Klein
section and am directed upstairs to the second
floor. Once I get to the second floor, on my way to
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the Calvin Klein section, I notice a more
prominently displayed line of Charter Club clothes,
Macy's own brand, designed to appeal to the same
people attracted by the style of Calvin Klein's
latest line of clothes. Let's say I get diverted
from my goal of reaching the Calvin Klein section,
the Charter Club stuff looks good enough to me, and
I purchase some Charter Club shirts instead. Has
Charter Club or Macy's infringed Calvin Klein's
trademark, simply by having another product more
prominently displayed before one reaches the Klein
line? Certainly not. . . .
. . . If I went to Macy's website and did a search
for a Calvin Klein shirt, would Macy's violate
Calvin Klein's trademark if it responded (as does
Amazon.com, for example) with the requested shirt
and pictures of other shirts I might like to
consider as well? I very much doubt it.  
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communic’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1035 (9th Cir. 2004)(Berzon, J., concurring).  This case squarely
presents the issue posed by Judge Berzon’s final question: If I
search for one of MTM’s trademarks, such as “mtm special ops,” is
Amazon infringing when it presents me with a list of watches from
MTM’s competitors?  MTM contends that Amazon is obliged to inform
the consumer that Amazon does not carry any products with that
brand before offering products from other brands in order to avoid
confusing the consumer.  Amazon maintains that so long as Amazon
labels the search results clearly as being from different brands,
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1 “Initial interest confusion is customer confusion that
creates initial interest in a competitor’s product.  Although
dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion
impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark
and is therefore actionable trademark infringement.”  Playboy
Enterprises, 354 F.3d at 1025.
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consumers will get what they want from their searches and Amazon
will not have infringed on MTM’s trademark.  The crux of the matter
is whether shoppers on Amazon are confused as to the source of the
products displayed in the list of search results.  
The Ninth Circuit recently dealt with a similar issue in
Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638
F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011).  In that case, the owner of the
trademark ACTIVEBATCH for business management software sued a
competitor, Network Automation, who had purchased keywords such as
“activebatch” from Google and Microsoft Bing.  Network Automation,
638 F.3d at 1142.  As a result, when users searched for
“ActiveBatch,” the results page would include sponsored links to
Network Automation’s website for its competing product.  Id.  The
court stressed the importance of the labeling of the
advertisements.  It pointed out that in Playboy Enterprises, the
infringement claims “relied on the fact that the linked banner
advertisements were ‘unlabeled,’ and were, therefore, more likely
to mislead consumers into believing they had followed a link to
Playboy’s own website.”  Id. at 1147 (citation omitted).  It
declined to “expand the initial interest confusion1 theory of
infringement beyond the realm of the misleading and deceptive to
the context of legitimate comparative and contextual advertising.” 
Id. at 1148.   
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2 “Any person who shall, without the consent of the
registrant--(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . .
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the
remedies hereinafter provided.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114. 
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To establish a trademark infringement claim under Section 32
or 43(a) of the Lanham Act,2 a plaintiff has the burden to
establish that a defendant is “using a mark confusingly similar to
a valid, protectable trademark” of defendant’s.  Brookfield
Communic’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046
(9th Cir. 1999).  Amazon argues that (1) it is not using MTM’s mark
in commerce and (2) there is no likelihood that consumers will be
confused, and that Amazon is therefore entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.  MTM disagrees, asserting that there are disputed
issues of fact as to whether consumers are likely to be confused.  
A. Use in Commerce
Because the court finds, as discussed below, that there is no
likelihood of confusion, the court need not resolve the issue of
whether Amazon is using the mark in commerce.  The court notes
briefly that the Ninth Circuit has held that the use of a trademark
as a search engine keyword that triggers the display of a
competitor’s advertisement is a “use in commerce” under the Lanham
Act.  Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1144-45.  This case is
distinguishable, insofar as Amazon is not selling trademarks to
competitors but instead is using behavior-based search technologies
that result in competitors’ products appearing when a trademarked
search term is entered.  Nonetheless, because Amazon’s use is in
connection with the sale of goods, it appears likely to be a “use
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3 MTM argues that Amazon’s behavior is a case of “passing off”
or “palming off.” “The tort of palming off by a third party dealer
is defined as the unauthorized substitution of the goods of one
manufacturer when the goods of another are requested by the
customer.”  K-S-H Plastics, Inc. v. Carolite, Inc., 408 F.2d 54, 59
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969).  MTM compares
Amazon’s behavior to the restaurant in Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland,
Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1982), where consumers who
specifically requested Coca-Cola were being served Pepsi-Cola. 
Menus and posted signs indicated that Pepsi-Cola was the only
beverage served in the restaurant.  Id. at 1253.  The court found
that those indications were not “sufficiently conspicuous” and did
not provide adequate notice of the substitution.  Id. at 1253-54.
Although the Ninth Circuit did not use the Sleekcraft factors in
resolving Overland, its concern with providing conspicuous notice
to customers indicates a fundamental concern with potential
consumer confusion.  The Sleekcraft factors provide a flexible
rubric for evaluating the likelihood of consumer confusion.  Thus,
the court finds no reason not to use those factors whatever
(continued...)
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in commerce” both in the jurisdictional sense and with respect to
the statutory infringement requirement. 
B. Likelihood of Confusion
Amazon claims that no reasonable trier of fact could find that
there is a likelihood of confusion resulting from Amazon’s use of
MTM’s mark(s).  Likelihood of confusion is the center of the 
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false designation
of origin claims in this case.  See Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1981); Brookfield Commc’ns, 174
F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999).  The factors for determining
likelihood of confusion are: “1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity
of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual
confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and the
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7.
defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of
expansion of the product lines.”  AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599
F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).3  It is unnecessary to meet every
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
3(...continued)
subgenre of trademark infringement claim this case might present. 
MTM has offered no support for the proposition that cases that
arguably concern passing off do not require a showing of likelihood
of confusion. 
Additionally, the instant situation does not appear to be a
case of palming off in the traditional sense.  It is akin to the
consumer asking for a Coca-Cola and receiving a tray with unopened,
labeled, authentic cans of Pepsi-Cola, RC Cola, Blue Sky Cola, Dr.
Pepper, and Sprecher Root Beer, and a copy of Coca Kola: The
Baddest Chick, by Nisa Santiago.  This is a substitution, but given
the context it is not infringing because it is not likely to
confuse.     
11
factor because the likelihood of confusion test is “fluid”. 
Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 631 (9th
Cir. 2005).  The test is fact intensive, and it thus is rarely
appropriate for deciding on summary judgment.  Au-Tomotive Gold,
Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1075 (9th Cir.
2006).
The Ninth Circuit has advised courts to be “acutely aware of
excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context;
emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”  Network
Automation, 638 F.3d at 1145-46 (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, 174
F.3d at 1054).  “In determining the proper inquiry for this
particular trademark infringement claim, [the court] adhere[s] to
two long stated principles: the Sleekcraft factors (1) are non-
exhaustive, and (2) should be applied flexibly, particularly in the
context of Internet commerce.  Finally, because the sine qua non of
trademark infringement is consumer confusion, when [the court]
examine[s] initial interest confusion, the owner of the mark must
demonstrate likely confusion, not mere diversion.”  Network
Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149.   
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4 MTM is correct that the Network Automation court did not
limit the likelihood of confusion analysis to the four cited
factors.  (Opp. at 11.)  The Network Automation court instead
explained why certain factors were less relevant than others to
evaluating confusion in the Internet advertising context.  This
case is sufficiently similar to Network Automation that those
factors are a useful starting point.  
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The Network Automation court determined that “[g]iven the
nature of the alleged infringement [in that case], the most
relevant factors to the analysis of the likelihood of confusion
are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the evidence of actual
confusion; (3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be
exercised by the purchaser; and (4) the labeling and appearance of
the advertisements and the surrounding context on the screen
displaying the results page.”  Id. at 1154. It found that certain
other factors were less relevant to the particular context.4  The
factors deemed less relevant are the following: 
Proximity of goods (factor 2): The court held that even though
the products were interchangeable (both were business management
software), that fact would “become less important if advertisements
are clearly labeled or consumers exercise a high degree of care,
because rather than being misled, the consumer would merely be
confronted with choices among similar products.”  Id. at 1150.  The
same is true in this case; although both Amazon and MTM sell
watches, which are identical products, this is misleading only if
the consumer is confused, not if the consumer simply has clearly
marked options.  
Similarity of marks (factor 3): The traditional Sleekcraft
analysis compares marks that are “similar in terms of sight, sound,
and meaning.”  Id. at 1150 (citing Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 351). 
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Here, as in Network Automation, “the consumer does not confront two
distinct trademarks.”  Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1151. 
Instead, the consumer types MTM’s mark into the search box and then
sees the mark that he or she typed appear in several places on the
search results page, along with competitors’ products.  It is
undisputed that consumers may be typing MTM’s mark into the search
box and that in reproducing this mark, Amazon uses it identically. 
The issue is not whether the marks are identical but whether
consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods
returned in the search results. Therefore, this factor is not
independently relevant.
Marketing Channels (factor 5): “Convergent marketing channels
increase the likelihood of confusion.”  Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at
353. “However, this factor becomes less important when the
marketing channel is less obscure. . . . “Given the broad use of
the internet today, . . . . this factor merits little weight.”   
Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1151 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). The fact that Amazon and MTM are both
selling watches on the Internet is too commonplace to affect the
likelihood of confusion analysis.  
Intent to Confuse (factor 7): The Network Automation court
pointed out that defendant’s intent may be relevant, “but only
insofar as it bolsters a finding that the use of the trademark
serves to mislead consumers rather than truthfully inform them of
their choice of products.”  Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1153. 
Therefore, this factor, like proximity of goods, must be considered
in the context of the clarity of labeling.  
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 The court agrees with Amazon that this case is similar enough
to Network Automation that the factors identified in that case
should be the starting point for its analysis.  
1. Strength of the Mark
“The stronger a mark—meaning the more likely it is to be
remembered and associated in the public mind with the mark’s
owner—the greater the protection it is accorded by the trademark
laws.”  Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1058.  “Two relevant
measurements are conceptual strength and commercial strength.” 
Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1149. 
a. Conceptual strength
“A mark's conceptual strength depends largely on the
obviousness of its connection to the good or service to which it
refers. The less obvious the connection, the stronger the mark, and
vice versa.”  Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores
Brand Mgmt., 618 F.3d 1025, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2010).  “[W]hile the
registration adds something on the scales, we must come to grips
with an assessment of the mark itself.”  Network Automation, 638
F.3d at 1149 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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5 MTM claims that it has three other marks at issue-PRO OPS,
AMERICAN WATCH, and MILITARY OPS- and that by not discussing them,
Amazon has waived arguments concerning their strength.  It is not
clear to what extent the other marks are in use.  The mark PRO OPS
appears on the back of watches only.  (Levy Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A,
Depo. Avicasis, president of MTM, 27:3-29:9.)  The mark AMERICAN
WATCH is used for a company that sells premium promotion watches,
purchased by companies and inscribed with those company names.  It
appears to be a mark for promotional watch services rather than for
watches.  Mr. Avicasis stated that no watches are branded American
Watch, but that through American Watch MTM sells “premium promotion
watches” with company names on them, such that American Watch is a
“business name that a customer might look for if they were
interested in promotional watches.”  (Depo. Avicasis, 31:14-33:2.) 
Be that as it may, while these three marks are arguably
distinctive enough to receive trademark protection for watches, at
least two of them are phrases (“pro ops” and “military ops”) that
could well be used to search for products other than watches, and
“American Watch” could be used to search for many types of watches
unconnected with MTM. These marks therefore are weaker than MTM
SPECIAL OPS, and the court’s analysis of MTM SPECIAL OPS applies
equally to those marks throughout the order. 
15
The marks at issue are MTM SPECIAL OPS and MILITARY OPS.5 
Amazon asserts that the marks are descriptive because the watches
designated by the marks were designed for members of the armed
forces involved in special military operations or “ops”.  (See
Depo. Avicasis 149:19-150:19)(“We design [the watches] for [Special
Operations Forces in the U.S. Military] . . . keeping in mind
that’s what people on the field or soldier on the field needs.”)
Amazon also submits a Google advertisement for MTM with the
description “Special Ops Watches worn by Special Ops and Special
Forces worldwide.”  (Levy Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. G.)  Amazon additionally
references a query by the trademark office as to whether the
watches “are intended to be used in ‘special operations’ or by
‘special operations’ personnel or forces.” (Levy Decl. ¶ 10, Exh. I
(emphasis omitted).) MTM’s attorney responded, “The term Special
Ops is nothing more tha[n] a suggestive reference to military type
watches.”  (Levy Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. J.) 
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 The spectrum of distinctiveness, ranging from generic marks
with no distinctiveness to arbitrary marks with no connection to
the product, includes in the middle “descriptive marks, which
describe the qualities or characteristics of a good or service and
only receive protection if they acquire secondary meaning, and
suggestive marks, which require a consumer to use imagination or
any type of multistage reasoning to understand the mark's
significance and automatically receive protection.”  Fortune
Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1033(alterations, internal citations, and
quotation marks omitted).  
Amazon’s evidence is persuasive in showing that the marks in
question are not strong; they are at best suggestive, and more
likely descriptive.  MTM argues that the marks are saved from
weakness by “MTM,” but while this may be sufficiently distinctive
to acquire trademark protection, it is not distinctive enough to
neutralize the rest of the mark’s descriptive connection to the
product.  Thus, this factor weighs in favor of Amazon.  
b. Commercial strength
Amazon has presented evidence that U.S. watch sales totaled
$9.1 billion in 2011.  (Levy Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. B.)  It presents
evidence that U.S. watch advertising expenses totaled over $365
million in a recent year.  (Id. Exh. C.)  Based on these figures,
it calculates that MTM had a minuscule fraction of the U.S. watch
market in both sales and advertising expenditures.  (Levy Decl.
Exh. A (Depo. Avicasis).)  The evidence concerning the size of the
U.S. watch market is in the form of online articles, which MTM
argues are inadmissible hearsay.  Amazon does not suggest that the
evidence falls within a hearsay exception.    
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6 “If a party plaintiff in a Board proceeding is to rely
simply on sales and advertising figures in an effort to establish
that its mark is famous, then it is incumbent upon that party
plaintiff to place the sales and advertising figures in context,
for example, by showing that the product is the leading product in
its category, the second leading product in its category etc. Raw
sales and advertising figures -- unless they are extraordinarily
large, which is not the case with opposer's FOSSIL products -- are
simply not sufficient by themselves to establish that the mark is
famous.”  Fossil Inc. v. Fossil Group, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1451  (P.T.O.
T.T.A.B 1998). 
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Without evidence showing MTM’s market share, the evidence of
MTM’s sales volume and advertising expenditures has little
significance.  Where a “mark has achieved actual marketplace
recognition,” advertising expenditures may be able to “transform a
suggestive mark into a strong mark.”  Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d
at 1058.6  Here, MTM has not presented evidence regarding its brand
recognition or its share of the market.  
Although it is MTM’s burden to establish likelihood of
confusion, MTM need not prevail on all the Sleekcraft factors to do
so.  Thus, the fact that MTM did not present evidence on this
particular sub-factor does not necessarily mean that the factor
weighs in favor of Amazon.    
Therefore, this sub-factor is neutral, since neither side has
presented admissible evidence as to MTM’s commercial strength.
c. Conclusion on strength  
Because Amazon has presented evidence that the mark is
conceptually weak, and neither side has presented admissible
evidence regarding the mark’s commercial strength, the strength 
factor weighs in favor of Amazon. 
///
///
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2. Actual confusion
“[A]ctual confusion is not necessary to a finding of
likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act.”    Network
Automation, 638 F.3d at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, “[a] showing of actual confusion among significant numbers
of consumers provides strong support for the likelihood of
confusion.”  Id. (quoting Playboy Enterprises, 354 F.3d at 1026).  
a. Evidence of no confusion
This case presents an unusual situation where one party claims
to have evidence that there is no actual confusion, not simply that
there is likely not confusion.  Amazon purports to present such
evidence.  Amazon retains and has presented data pertaining to
individual search queries and the number of purchases resulting
from them in the same day.  (Jaye Decl. ¶ 12, Exh. D.) It provides
the data regarding how often a consumer’s search for “mtm special
ops” or “mtm special ops watch” results in the consumer placing a
product in a shopping cart or in a purchase.  (Id.)  Amazon then
contrasts the same data for search queries for “luminox” (a major
competitor of MTM) or “luminox watch.”  (Id. at ¶ 15, Exh. F.) 
Consumers are twenty-one times as likely to purchase a product when
searching for Luminox as when searching for an MTM Special Ops
brand.  (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.)  Based on this data, Amazon concludes
that there is no actual confusion: “[i]f consumers were actually
confused into believing that MTM was the source of a Luminox watch
displayed when a user searches for ‘mtm special ops’ or ‘mtm
special ops watch,’ one would expect that a substantial percentage
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7The fact that people are searching for “mtm special ops
watch” and not purchasing anything suggests that they may be
searching for that watch in particular. This could be, but is not
used by MTM as, evidence of the strength of the mark. 
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of consumers who searched for those terms would have purchased such
a watch.”7 (Mot. at 17.) 
MTM critiques this data for registering only those sales and
selections made on the same day the search was performed, whereas,
by Amazon’s own account, there are reasons why a consumer might put
a product into the cart but purchase it at a later date.  Amazon
persuasively responds that the value of this data is not absolute
but relative; there is no reason to think that those consumers
searching for Luminox would exhibit different behaviors from those
searching for MTM Special Ops.  Because the “luminox” search is
more than twenty-one times as likely to result in purchase, the
court finds that Amazon has presented evidence that there is no
actual confusion.
Additionally, MTM points to evidence that search queries for
“mtm” were much higher than for “mtm special ops.”  The average
price of the units sold based on a search for “mtm” was
dramatically lower than the prices of MTM’s competitors’ watches.
(Cohen Decl. Exh. C; Jaye Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. A.)  Therefore, this is
not evidence that a consumer searching for an MTM watch on Amazon
is confused and as a result buys a competitor’s watch.
b. Evidence of actual confusion
MTM’s president Yoav Avicasis testified that he had knowledge
of actual confusion, but he was unable to present any specific
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8 Amazon also asserts that most of this testimony would be
inadmissible hearsay, since Mr. Avicasis stated that complaints go
to the consumer affairs department.  
9“[T]he default degree of consumer care is becoming more
(continued...)
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instances or records of actual consumer confusion.8  (Depo.
Avicasis 69:10-85:16, 86:25-87:1, 146:12-149:18.)  His testimony is
too vague to constitute evidence on this point. 
3. Degree of care and type of goods
MTM’s watches range in price from several hundred dollars to
two thousand dollars.  (Levy Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A at 37:17-25.) 
“[W]hen the goods are expensive, the buyer can be expected to
exercise greater care in his purchases; again, though, confusion
may still be likely.”  Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1152
(quoting Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353)(internal quotation marks
omitted).  Because watches sold by MTM’s competitors are relatively
expensive, they would seem to involve a high degree of care. 
MTM contends that buyers may not know the price range before
searching on Amazon and that therefore care may not necessarily be
presumed, since Amazon’s price range for watches is very broad,
going as low as $14.00. That may be so in general, but the least
expensive watch that results from the search query “mtm special
ops” is $145.00, and the first five watches displayed are listed
for $299.00, $687.73, $320.00, $196.33, and $385.00. (Jaye Decl.,
Exh. A.)
The court finds that the relatively high price of the goods in
question, combined with the increased degree of care used in
Internet purchases, mean that consumers are presumed to use a high
degree of care in such purchases.9 
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9(...continued)
heightened as the novelty of the Internet evaporates and online
commerce becomes commonplace.”  Network Automation, 638 F.3d at
1152.  
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4. Labeling and context
“In the keyword advertising context the likelihood of
confusion will ultimately turn on what the consumer saw on the
screen and reasonably believed, given the context.”  Network
Automation, 638 F.3d at 1153 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The same central issue is at play where online retail search
results are concerned.
MTM offers an expert report to prove that Amazon’s search
results are “ambiguous, misleading, and confusing.”  (Decl. Markson
¶ 3, Exh. 1 p. 9.)  Markson arrives at the following conclusion: 
In my opinion, Amazon has created some very useful and
innovative technology.  However, they present their
results in a misleading fashion and should better explain
to users what they’re looking at in order to avoid
confusion. 
It would appear that they are doing what is best for
sales.  In many cases, the BBS derived data is very
useful for users but when presented in the exact manner
as they have done, it can also be very misleading.  This
is particularly evident in the case of certain trademark
products that are not carried on the site.  
Id. at pp. 17-18.   
Markson’s analysis suggests that consumers may be confused
about why they are receiving certain search results.  He compares
the Amazon results page to pages from other search engines and
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10 The statute requires that a use of a mark “is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.”  15
U.S.C.A. § 1125.  
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points out potential confusion.  For instance, “[s]ome users with
sufficient computer experience” may believe that because their
search term appears in quotation marks below the search box, the
site searched for that specific phrase in generating the search
results.  (Id. at 9.)  Or, the user might see a strike-through in
one term and not in another and believe that the remaining search
results must include the term “mtm.”  (Id.)  
Be that as it may, Markson did not conduct a study to
determine whether users of Amazon are likely to be confused as to
source.  Absent such a study, the evidence Markson presents is
relevant to show that consumers may be confused about how the site
functions, but it does not indicate that they are confused as to
the source of the products.  A consumer could, for instance, puzzle
over why the search query “mtm special ops” produced a results page
listing ten watches but none of them with the MTM brand without
also being confused as to the source of the watches presented on
the results page.  Markson’s report goes only to the first issue.  
Given this, the court finds that MTM has presented no evidence
that consumers are likely to be confused as to source, as required
by the statute.10  The court does not hold that such evidence could
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11 The court also notes that there could potentially be a
likelihood confusion if the search results included products with
marks that were substantially similar to the mark used as a search
query.  Here, however, the marks of the watches listed in the
search results bear little if any resemblance to MTM’s mark. Thus,
the court need not reach this issue.  
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not be presented through a consumer survey,11 for instance, only
that it has not been presented here. 
5. Conclusion on Likelihood of Confusion
The court finds that the analysis of the relevant Sleekcraft
factors establishes that there is no likelihood of confusion in
Amazon’s use of MTM’s trademarks in its search engine or display of
search results.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the court GRANTS the motion.  
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 20, 2013
DEAN D. PREGERSON           
United States District Judge
